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Investing in FEMA: A Role for Government in Pro-
tecting Opportunity 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) played a central—and often controversial—role in the 
federal government’s response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Subsequent investigations have revealed that the 
agency made critical missteps during those disasters and was slow to address the basic needs of people in the Gulf 
Coast region. But the history of FEMA shows that it can be an important and effective component of our coun-
try’s disaster response and recovery system. The FEMA that responded to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita was weak-
ened by systematic disinvestment over time, which diminished the agency’s ability to address national disasters.  
 
Unfortunately, FEMA’s diminished role is part of a larger pattern of disinvestment in federal agencies responsible 
for security and opportunity in America. While FEMA is a noteworthy example with dramatic consequences, it is 
only one of many important federal programs that now lack adequate resources and authority. 
 
FEMA’s history also shows that reinvesting in our government’s capacity to address national problems yields 
both immediate and long-term benefits for our country. This fact sheet reviews that history and offers recommen-
dations for rebuilding our national infrastructure for safety and opportunity. 
 
A Short History of FEMA 
In order to understand how government can play 
an affirmative role in protecting citizens in the 
wake of a disaster, it is useful to understand the 
recent history of federal emergency management 
efforts. 
 
FEMA’s origins and early lessons: 
1979 FEMA was created after a series of se-
vere natural disasters hit several states. 
FEMA’s objective was to prepare for 
and handle the effects of all hazards that 
the nation might face.1  
1992  Hurricane Andrew struck Florida. 
FEMA provided nearly $2 billion for the 
response and recovery effort.2 At the 
time, Andrew was the costliest hurricane 
disaster in FEMA’s history. Unfortu-
nately, poor planning and a weak re-
sponse by the federal government in-
cited strong criticism and motivated the 
agency’s reorganization.3 
1993  A series of post-Andrew recommenda-
tions was implemented, and the 
agency’s new mission was focused on 
disaster relief. 
 
FEMA became an example of government 
strength and support in the mid-1990s: 
1994  An executive order elevated FEMA to 
cabinet-level status. The director of 
FEMA would now report directly to the 
  
president and the National Security 
Council on matters relating to prepared-
ness and response.4  
 
For the first time an experienced emer-
gency-response administrator was ap-
pointed to run the agency.5 
 
Funding for the agency increased com-
pared to its appropriations in the late 
1980s, and FEMA responded success-
fully to a number of major disaster dec-
larations, including the Oklahoma City 
bombing in 1995 and Hurricane Fran in 
1996.6 
 
Beginning in 2003, however, much of FEMA’s 
independence and authority were compromised: 
• FEMA became one of 22 agencies sub-
sumed within the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS). FEMA lost its cabinet-
level status and its independence. 
• With the reorganization FEMA also lost its 
prime objective of using an “all-hazards” 
approach to disaster response.7 In fact, the 
Government Accountability Office docu-
mented a decline in funding for all-hazards 
programs within DHS, and predicted a fur-
ther decrease of more than $200 million 
from 2005 to 2006.8 
• Prior to the creation of DHS, FEMA’s pre-
paredness and recovery programs ad-
dressed all disasters, both natural and man-
made. However, in 2005 the Government 
Accountability Office reported that nearly 
three out of every four FEMA grant dollars 
went to programs solely concerned with 
terrorism-related disasters.9 Limiting the 
funding to only one kind of disaster hin-
dered FEMA’s ability to handle all types of 
major events. 
• FEMA was no longer responsible for pre-
paredness strategies and lost its authority 
over disaster mitigation, when its Office of 
Domestic Preparedness and Office of State 
and Local Government Coordination were 
combined into one entity independent of 
FEMA.10 
 
 
The Consequences of a Weakened FEMA 
By the time Hurricane Katrina became a Cate-
gory 5 hurricane and caused New Orleans to 
flood, FEMA had been stripped of much of its 
authority and capacity. As a result millions of 
Gulf Coast residents were without a government 
safety net when Katrina struck. 
• According to the DHS’s inspector general, 
a shortage of qualified staff contributed to a 
lack of oversight and overwhelmed FEMA 
employees in the response to Hurricane Ka-
trina.11 When Katrina hit, FEMA was un-
derstaffed by approximately 500 employ-
ees. As the 2005 hurricane season began, 
many of the people on staff were new and 
untrained.12 
• An estimated $800 million in federal grants 
for first responders was managed outside of 
FEMA.13 Lacking the authority to coordi-
nate local and state preparedness programs, 
FEMA  responded to Hurricane Katrina’s 
destruction with instances of miscommuni-
cation and a lack of coordination among the 
numerous departments and agencies. 
 
The lack of trained experienced staff likely con-
tributed to mismanagement of emergency assis-
tance and reconstruction contracts, problems that 
disadvantaged minority and local businesses: 
• More than 70% of Katrina-related contracts 
worth over $500,000—about 1,200 con-
tracts in total—were awarded with less than 
full and open competition. Nearly 800 in-
vestigations have been opened into possible 
crimes by contractors, including theft, 
fraud, wrongful claims, and overbilling; 
174 indictments have been handed down.14  
• Overwhelmed contracting staff were each 
responsible for overseeing an average of 
$163 million in contracts annually, a figure 
that is over seven times the industry aver-
age.15 
• Minority businesses were largely passed 
over for reconstruction work until October 
2005, when Congress questioned FEMA’s 
actions. In February 2006 minority-owned 
  
businesses accounted for only 2.4% of the 
$5.1 billion awarded by FEMA. This was a 
slight increase from the previous October, 
when minority-owned businesses received 
a mere 1.5% of the federal contracts.16 
• After allegations of favoritism arose, more 
than 30 contracts were awarded to local and 
small businesses in the Gulf Coast region 
for work that was previously being carried 
out by large out-of-state contractors.17 
 
Trends in Disinvestment in Other Govern-
ment Agencies 
The weakening of FEMA is part of a broader 
pattern of disinvestment in our federal govern-
ment’s ability to address national problems. For 
example: 
• The Head Start program has been a proven 
success in improving early childhood edu-
cation outcomes. Despite the program’s 
positive effects on children and their par-
ents, funding for Head Start is so low that 
the program is unable to serve more than 
half of eligible preschoolers.18 
• The Low-Income Home Energy Assistance 
Program helps low-income families meet 
their energy needs, such as assistance with 
cooling and heating costs in unsafe and ex-
treme weather conditions. Although the 
number of eligible families has grown, the 
amount of federal funding has languished. 
Only 17% of those eligible are receiving 
the help they need.19 
• The Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration (OSHA) is charged with pro-
tecting workers from exploitation and 
abuse. Without strong enforcement of laws 
that ensure safe working conditions, the na-
tion’s workforce remains vulnerable and 
insecure. OSHA’s budget for enforcement 
programs declined, while funding for vol-
untary compliance programs grew at an av-
erage yearly rate of over 9% from 1996 to 
2003. These voluntary programs further 
strain limited resources for adequate over-
sight. Moreover, such growth could impair 
program quality. 20 
 
Reinvesting in FEMA 
Because of FEMA’s potential strength in the 
event of a disaster, communities look to the 
agency for a chance to start over. Among its 
many roles, the agency is authorized by legisla-
tion to facilitate many important services during 
a recovery period. With appropriate federal in-
vestment FEMA can once again fulfill its man-
date, which includes: 
• Housing. FEMA can provide temporary 
housing, vouchers, and grants for home re-
pairs in the event of a disaster.21 
• Crisis counseling. Because a person’s emo-
tional and mental health are often at risk af-
ter a major disaster, FEMA can coordinate 
with the National Institute of Mental Health 
to provide needed crisis counseling.22 
• Unemployment assistance. Individuals who 
become unemployed as a result of a major 
disaster can receive assistance from FEMA, 
until they are able to return to work.23 
• Legal services. FEMA can provide legal 
resources to individuals in need of advice, 
counseling, and representation as a result of 
a major disaster.24
 
 
Recommendations 
As the nation recovers from and repairs the damage done by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, it is time to re-
invest in our government’s ability to address national problems, starting with a reinvigorated FEMA. 
Without a strong national system in place, the devastation and paralysis that result from weakened gov-
ernment institutions could reoccur anywhere in our country. Bold and sustained steps are needed to re-
store FEMA’s capacity, effectiveness, and oversight: 
 
• To limit the potential for fraud and abuse, and to ensure that the government pays a fair price for 
goods and services, FEMA and other government agencies involved in emergency response 
  
should conduct full and open competition for contracts to the extent possible. Once contracts are 
awarded, agencies should exercise strong oversight, and should ensure that staff are adequately 
trained in contract acquisition and management.25 
• FEMA should better enforce and understand the Stafford Act, which stipulates that emergency 
contracting should preference local contractors doing business in the affected areas. Because the 
Gulf Coast region will face future storm-related emergencies, FEMA should establish preap-
proved contracts with local businesses, so that emergency work can begin immediately when the 
need arises.26 Minority businesses, in particular, should be able to compete on a level playing 
field for these contracts. 
• FEMA’s authority within DHS should be elevated in order to establish a direct line of communi-
cation to the president of the United States and members of the cabinet. A more direct advisory 
role in securing the nation will ensure better coordination among government agencies and rees-
tablish the importance of FEMA’s recovery efforts after any and all major disasters.27 
• FEMA should meet its self-imposed deadline to fill 95% of staff vacancies by summer 2006, and 
ultimately should increase its staffing to full capacity.28 Without enough employees to handle the 
large-scale tasks involved in emergency response, FEMA will not be able to execute even the 
best-made plans. 
• FEMA should provide consistent training to all new employees, so that staff members are quali-
fied and capable. Just as the agency’s administrator should be an experienced crisis manager, it is 
crucial that FEMA staff are prepared to fulfill the agency’s mandate.29 
• FEMA should use its grant programs to prepare for and respond to all types of disasters, be they 
floods, fires, earthquakes, or terrorism-related. Federal grants that can be used to address both 
natural and man-made disasters are a helpful and effective way of truly using an all-hazards ap-
proach to emergency response.30 
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